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PRENTISS MOORE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LEOPOLD 
FELLNER et al., Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Attorneys-Oompensation-Oontracta-For Oontingent Fees. 
-Where an attorney and his clients entered into a contingent 
fee contract that he was to receive for his legal services in 
prosecuting one action and defending another a percentage of 
any amount recovered from a third party and that, "at our 
[the clients'] option," the attorney was to handle these eases 
"in any of the higher courts," he could not successfully urge 
that he was to handle an appeal only when the managing client 
"exercised his option and notified him," in view of the fact that 
the attorney had already, with such client's consent, handled 
all steps proper to be performed up to that time relative to the 
[1] Bee Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 188 et seq.; Am.Jur., At-
torneys at Law, § 163 et seq. 
iricK. Dig. References: [1] Attorneys, § 102; [2] Attorneys, 
§ 100; [3-6] Attorneys, § 92; [7,8] Attorneys, § 104; [9, 11J Attor. 
neys, §ll9; [10] Abatement, §76; [12] Attorneys, §123. 
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appeal, had notified the client of the charges for appeal tran-
seripts, had been advised hy the client that these and addi-
tional costs would be paid, and had originally drafted the 
eruployment eontraet between the parties, but that the words 
"and, at our option, in any of the higher courts," and a pro-
vision that the elient was not to pay as costs the "fees to any 
other attorneys you [plaintiff] may employ in these matters" 
were inserted by the client in the eontract to make sure that, 
if the ease were lost, he would have no obligation of any kind 
to the attorney or anyone employed by the attorney for any 
services in the matter, since it was inferribl~ that the attorney 
did not understand the option provision to apply if, as actually 
occurred, the ease was won in the trial court. 
[2] Id.-Compensation-Contracts-ConstructioD.-Where an at-
toruey handling eertain litigation for his client pursuant to a 
contingent fee contract obligating him to handle an appeal if 
the client so eleeted twice wrote the client that if the client 
wished to have his office handle the appeal "our fee would 
be $2,000.00" in addition to any costs on appeal, the trial 
court was warranted in interpreting such language as a de-
mand by the attorney for payment of an additional fee and a 
refusal to handle the appeal unless it was paid, and in conclud-
ing that the attorney's demand was wrongful and a breach 
of his contract, and the client was not bound to make further 
demands for performance by the attorney but was justified in 
accepting his conduet as a termination of "your relationship 
as our attorney" and in employing other counsel to handle the 
appeal. 
[3] Id.-CompensatioD-Effect of Discharge or Withdrawal From 
Oase.-An attorney who wrongfully abandons or withdraws 
from a case which he has contracted to handle, or who has 
been discharged for cause by the client, may not recover com-
pensation where the contract of employment was entire and 
indivisible, but recovery for services rendered up to the date 
of a discharge for cause may be allowed where the services 
are regarded as divisible and one severable portion of them 
has been fully performed. 
[4&, fb] Id."""OompensatioD-Eft'ect·ilf Discharge.-Where an at-
torney and client at the time'of entering into a contingent fee 
contract contemplated that the attorney's services should be 
divisible into those rendered in superior court and on any 
appeal from a superior court judgment, and the expression 
"and, at our option, in any of the higher courts" was inserted 
[3] See Cal . .Tur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 194; Am . .Tur., Attorneys 
at Law, § 172. 
) 
'382 MOORE v. FELLNER {50 C.2d 
into the contract by the client who thus clearly indicated that 
he wished to reserve the right to change counsel on appeal, if 
the services were to be divisible for the client's benefit at his 
option they should also be treated as divisible for the attor-
lillY'S benefit, if the interests of justice 80 require, especially 
when the attorney had completed his services in connection 
with the action he undertook to defend and had not failed to 
perform any service which had become due for performance 
up· to the time he was discharged for cause in making nnjusti-
fied demands for an additional fee for an appeal; the attorney 
was entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered 
up to the time of termination of the attorney-client relation-
ship, less any expense or other damage to which the client was 
subjected by the attorney's defanlt. 
[6] Id.-Oompensation-Efi'ect of Discharge.-An attorney dis-
charged for sufficient cause is entitled to no more than the 
reasonable value of his services rendered prior to his dis-
charge, has no cause to complain and is fnlly protected by 
payment of the reasonable value, and may not recover the fnII 
contract amount (at least if such amount exceeded the reason-
able value of the services.) 
[8] Id.-Oompensation-Eifect of Discharge.-Where an attorney 
is discharged without cause and the contract amount is less 
than the reasonable value of the services, recovery is never-
theless limited to the fee fixed by the contract. 
[7] Id.-Compensation-Contracts-For Oontingent Fees-Effect 
of Discharge.-An attorney employed under a contingent fee 
agreement who is wrongly discharged by his client is generally 
entitled to the same amount of compensation and under the 
same eontingency as if he had completed the services· con-
templated. 
[8] Id.-Oompensation-Oontracts-For Oontingent Fees-Effect 
of Discharge.-If the recovery of an attorney wrongfully dis-
charged 'Onder a contingent fee employment is limited to the 
same contingency as if he had completed the services, then 
one whose discharge has been for cause should be similarly 
limited, i.e., even though the measure of his recovery is the 
reasonable value of his services rather than (and not in excess 
of) the full contract amount, he should not have judgment 
until the contingency has occurred. 
[9] Id.-Oompensation-Pleading-Defenses.-In an action to re-
cover the reasonable value of services performed by an attor-
ney under a contingent fee contract until discharged for cause, 
the unfavored defense that the action was prematurely brought 
becansefiled before occurrence .of the contingency is simply 
matter of' abatement which must be pleaded in proper time 
or it is waived. 
) 
,/ 
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[10] Abatement-Proceedings-Waiver.-If the defense that the 
action was prematurely brought docs not exist at the time 
defendant seeks to raise it, there is no occasion to consider 
whether it has been waived, since it may be disregarded. 
[11) Attorneys ~ Compensation - Pleading - Defenses. - In an 
action to' recover the reasonable value of services performed 
by an attorney under a contingent fee contract, where defend-
ant first raised the point of premature filing of the action by 
objection to the introduction of evidence and by motion for 
nonsuit when the case was on trial, and at a time when the 
basis of the objection had been rendered nonexistent by the 
client's actual recovery from a third party, the court was 
justified in ruling against the plea. 
(12) Id. - Compensation - Evidence-Value' of Bervices.-In an 
action to recover the reasonable value of services performed 
by an attorney under a contingent fee contract, .where plain-
tiff testified to the time he had spent, as well as that another 
attorney, who was employed by him, had devoted some 450 
hours to assisting him in preparation of the eases involved, 
and where the client testified that most of his communications 
and contacts with plaintiff's office were made with the other 
attorney rather than with plaintiff personally, thus making it 
clear that the client's employment of plaintiff contemplated 
the participation of other attorneys in the services rendered 
by plaintiff, although the cost of their services was by the 
employment contract included in the fee to be paid plaintiff, 
. the other attorney's services should be considered in deter-
mining the reasonable value of the services rendered by plain-
tiff to the client, and the trial court erred in its express 
refusal to consider the time spent on the eases by the other 
attorney. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Arnold Praeger, Judge. Reversed with 
directions. 
..-
Action to recover attorney's fees on a contingency fee con-
tract. Judgment for -plaintitI for less than amount sued for, 
reversed with directions. 
George Bouchard for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Sidney Dorfman for Defendants and Appellants. 
SCHAUER, J.-From a judgment for $12,825 in plaintitI's 
favor in his action to recover the reasonable value of services 
rendered by him as an attorney. both plaintitI and defendants 
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appeal. Plaintiff contends that the award is inadequate, 
and defendants, claiming breach of contract by plaintiff,l 
urge that judgment should have been in their favor. We have 
concluded that plaintiff has established a prevailing right. 
and that the judgment should be reversed and the value of 
the services redetermined. 
The contract between the parties is evidenced by writings 
in the form of letters. These, and other writings between the 
parties, appear in the margin. The first is dated May 29, 
1951, and constitutes the contract by which defendants (here-
inafter sometimes referred to as Fellner) employed plaintiff 
to represent them as attorney in certain litigation.2 By this 
contract Moore was employed on a contingent fee basis to 
prosecute an action by Fellner against one Steinbaum for 
damages arising from breach of contract, and lor tke same 
contingent lee to also defend Fellner in an action brought 
'Defendants b;y their cross-complaint sought a declaration that the;y 
owed plaintiff nothing. 
"Mr. Prentiss Moore 
Attorne;y at Law 
453 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles 13, California. 
"Dear Mr. Moore: 
a" Ma;y 29, 1951 
"This will eonfirm our oral understanding that ;you are to represent 
m;yself and m;y wife in the prosecution of a claim against Morris Stein· 
baum arising from a breach of contract dated the fourteenth da;y of 
April 1951 and also that ;you are to defend an action against us filed b;y 
Irvin D. Berzon in the Superior Court, being Action No. 585893 • 
• , A. eompensation for ;your services in these matters we agree to pa;y 
;you 20% of an;y amount recovered from Morris Steinbaum before trial 
and 25% if the action proceeds to trial, including three da;ys before the 
start 04! the trial. We agree to advance all neceB8ar;y eosts, including 
eourt coats, depositions or an;y othcr costs incurred incident to the prepa-
ration of the ease such &8 appraisers' fees and expert witness' fees, but 
not fees to any other attorneys you may employ in these matters. We 
are depositing at this time with ;you .500.00 on account of such costs 
and agree to make available any additional amounts nece88ar;y for these 
purposes upon notice from you. However, all these advances will be 
deducted from the amount to be recovered and the compensation of 20% 
or 25% reap. will be based on the net amount. 
"In addition to this we are depositing another .500.00 as an advance 
paYIlIent which will be a retainer. However, this amonnt will be deducted 
from your compensation of 20% or 25'10 resp. 
"It is understood that this agreement covers our understanding to the 
conclusion of these two eases in the Superior Court and, at our option, 
in any of the higher courts. 
,. Approved: 
Prentiss Moore" 
"Yours ver;y trul;y 
Leopold Fellner 
Clara M. Fellner 
) 
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against him by one Berzon for a broker's commission arising 
out of the same transaction. Moore's compensation for the 
dual services was to be 20 per cent of any amount recovered 
from Steinbaum in a settlement before trial and 25 per cent 
in ease of trial. -He was paid $500 on account of costs and an 
additional $500 "as an advance payment which will be a 
retainer." The two actions were consolidated for trial and 
resulted in (1) a jUdgment of $104,500 in favor of Fellner 
and against Steinbaum, and (2) a judgment of $20.000 against 
FeUner and in favor of Berzon, which was settled for $17,500. 
Steinbaum filed notice of appeal. Moore t('8tified that there-
after his office "went right on handling the ease on appeal" 
as various matters arose needing attention, including arrang-
ing for a clerk's and a reporter's transcript. "authorization 
for aU exhibits to be sent up to the Distriet Court of Appeal 
and any and all other preparations which were incidental to 
and short of the writing of the brief and the details going to 
that point, " as weU as entering into a stipulation under which 
$110,000 in United States Treasury Certificates were deposited 
by Steinbaum in lieu of an undertaking on appeal. 
On March 2, 1954, before appellant 8fe.inbau-m's brief had 
been received, and when the services caned for by the con-
tract, insofar as they had then accrued, had been faithfu.lly 
performed, Moore wrote to Mr. and Mrs. Fellner stating that 
if they wished him to handle th~ appeal his fee would be 
$2,000 plus the necessary costs.' On March 3, 1954, Mr . 
.. Mr. and Mrs. Leopold Fellner 
9970 West Pieo Blvd. 
Los Angeles, California 
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fellner: 
... Mareb 2, 1954 
"The deposit of 1110,000.00 of Treasury Certificates haa been made 
by the defendant Steinbaum and we have received notification that the 
Clerk'lI Transcript has been prepared and the appeal iB proceeding . 
•• The reason for writing you at thJ.- time is to advise you that in 0111' 
opinion the respondents' briefs and tbe costs on appeal will approximate 
1500.00, of course, depending npon the It'JIgtb of our reply to tbe appel-
lant's brief. We IIbould like to have you ad'l"ise as BOon &8 pOllllible all to 
wbetber you desire this otllce to handle the appeal and if 110, our fee wil1 
be .2,000.00, plu8 the necessary costs above outlined. Sbould you desire 
any other firm to bandle the appeal, kindly notify us a8 BOon &8 pouible 
and I am enclosing the only current obligation which iB now due, the 
cost of the balance of the Reporter's Transcript in the amount of .16.00 • 
•• Respectfully, 
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Fellner replied," referring to the provision of the employment 
contract2 reading as follows: "It is understood that this 
agreement covers our understanding to the conclusion of 
these two cases in the Superior Court and, at our option, in 
any of the higher courts." Moore replied on March 10,' and 
"Mr. Prentiss Moore 
.17 South Hill Street 
Los Angeles'lB, Calif. 
"Dear Mr. Moore: 
.. , March B, 19M 
"I have reeeived your letter of Mareb 2nd and I have paid the bill of 
$16.00 to the Reporter. 
"I assume that you overlooked that part of our agreement whieb 
specifieally stipulates that the agreed fees cover and include all the 
appeals. I would appreciate it if you' would let me know your eonsidered 
opinion about this IIl!'tter. 
"Whatever the court costs will be we will make payments npon receipt 
of the bills to the court Reporter as in the past. 
"Mr. Leopold Fellner 
9970 West Pico Blvd. 
Los Angeles, California 
"Dear Mr. Fellner: 
., Cordially 70urs, 
Leopold Fellner" 
"'March 10,19M 
"I am at a IOS9 to understand the position taken in your letter of 
Mareb Brd inasmuch as during the negotiations which we had leading to 
the making of our agreement with respect to the fees of this oftiee, it 
wss clearly understood to be through proceedings in the Superior Court. 
"As 70U may recall. 10U pointed out at the time you corrected the 
letter whieb we had prepared for 70ur signature on May 25, 1951, 
(altered by your letter of May 29. 19!il) that what you wanted clearly 
understood was, regardle&ll of the outcome of the proceedings in the 
Superior Court, 70U wanted to have the opportunity of ebOO8ing otber 
eounsel if you _11' fit after the tennination of the Htigation in the 
Superior Court. . 
"As you well know, we at DO time ever made any agreement that 
presupposed the carrying of 10ur litigation beyond the Superior Court 
UIIder the contingent fee arrangement of twenty-five per cent of the 
reeover,. from Morris Steinbaum any more than it would be assumed 
that we would earr,. an appeal in the event the litigation was lost in the 
trisl court, through the state appellate courts and possibly the Supreme 
Cour of the United States, without any compensation. Your only' 
request was that 10U be allowed the opportunity of changing COUDAeI 
after the determination of the proceedings in the trial court. 
"In accordance with that understanding we wrote you on the 2nd, 
due to the imminence of the appeal, to advise 10U that it 11'&8 still satill' 
factory with this office for you to eboose any counllel for the purpose of 
defending your rights on appeal; that IIhould you eare to have this omce 
represent you in the appeal, that our fee would be 12,000.00 in addition 
to any costs on appeal. 
"As you may recall, you asked for and were given the balance of 
costs that had been deposited in eonne('tion with the trial litigation after 
the judgment hRd been entered. We received notice that the next amount 
) 
.) 
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on March 13 Fellner wrote Moore· again ea11ing attention to 
the above-quoted contract provision and declaring, among 
iDe is t25.80, payable to the County Clerk for preparation of the Clerk'a 
Tl1UllICript on Appeal, 'Which mUBt be paid b7 Mareh Uth • 
•• Bespectfully, 
Moore, Webster, Lindelof " Bqhea 
Prentiu Moore" 
-"Kareb 18,19M 
UMe8IIrs. Moore, Webster, Lindelof" Bqhes 
417 South BilI Street 
Loa Angeles 18, California 
"Dear Mr. Moore: 
"I have received ;your letter of March 10th. The reading of it 1faI 
quite a Ihoeking experience to UI. Aa I outlined in my letter of Karch 
8rd we were ·confident that ;you overlooked the terms of our qreement 
and that ;your considered opinion, based on the terms of the contract, 
would not differ from ours. 
"Your atatements and implicatioUi are falae and iesigned to diItort 
the issues. We never considered and negotiated about anything e1l8 hut 
a contingenc;y fee wbieb would cover the litigation to the final latis-
famon of our claim, and, if nee8ssar;y, at our option, any litigation to 
the higbest court. Tbe purpose of a contingency arrangement had no 
other purpose for UI but to assure ourselves against payments of attor· 
ne;ys' fees whieb would be difticult for UI to handle. We emphasised this 
in our agreement by laying: • of any amount recovered from Morris 
Steinbaum. • Aa if this would not be enougb, we emphasized it again: 
'it is understood that this agreement covers our understanding to the 
conclusion of th818 two cases in the Superior Court and, at our option, 
in any of the higbest courts.' 
•• I do not understand wbat bearing our rigbt to ehange counsel would 
have on this matter • .till I wish to atate the facts as they are. When 
I asked you during our negotiations wbat the purpose of a retainer fee 
was, when there is a contingency fee arrangement, yOU explained that 
this was just lomething like earnest money in cue I would change coun-
sel and there was never any suggestion on m;y part that I would eonsider 
this pOlsibUit;y. 
"You used the fact that I picked up the balanee of our deposit with 
70U to diItort the issues. You know well what happened. When we had to 
pay, without prior notice from yo~ .over t1,500 to the Court Reporter 
and Appraiser, I told ;yOU that it was ver;y difticult for UI to raile thil 
money on sueb a Ihort notice. Then I suggested that, as we were paying 
tbe bills direct to the. Court Reporter, and other expenseB, it would not 
lerve any purpose to have a deposit 17ing around in your oflice. 
"We eannot lee any pOlBibility of a misunderstanding Oil 70ur part. 
We cannot look at it in aD7 otber way but that 70U tried to take advan-
tage of our :Position. This, of couree, has disrupted and destroyed an;y 
relatjonsbip of confidence between UI. We must COl1sider that you bave 
deliberately breaebed our agreement of Ma;y 29th, 1951. For that reason 
1) we consider 70ur relationsbip as our attorne;y terminated b;y ;your 
eonduct and we will leek other eounsel to represent UI in this litigation. 
2) Tbe agreement of Ma;y 29th, 1951, between us has been terminated 
by 70U and we must accept tbe termination of the contract and aet 
aecordingl;y. 
• 'OUf new counsel will contact ;you as SOOI1 as possible. He will conduct 
any necessar;y negotiations with ;you .. lour behalf. 
II Yours ver;y trIll;y, 
Leopold Fellner" 
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other things, that "We must consider that you have deliber-
ately breached our agreement of May 29, 1951. For that 
reason 1) we consider your relationship as our attorney ter-
minated • . . and will seek other counsel to represent us in 
this litigation." Moore replied on March 19.1 Moore declined 
to sign a substitution of attorneys and Fellner obtained an 
order in the District Court of Appeal substituting other coun-
sel on the appeal. Thereafter on June 30, 1954, Moore again 
wrote to Fellner.8 The judgment against Steinbaum was 
affirmed on appeal (Fellner v. Steinbaum (1955), 132 Cal. 
App.2d 509 [282 P.2d 584]), and Fellner was paid some 
$117,000 (which included interest) thereunder. The substi-
tuted counsel charged Fellner $1,000 for handling the appeal. 
"Mr. Leopold Fellner 
9970 West Pico Blvd. 
LoJ Angeles, California 
"Dear Mr. Fellner: 
9"Ka!eh 19, 19M 
"I have ,"our letter of March 13th. Of cou.rae, most of the statementa 
,.ou make in ;your letter &II to facti are 11lIfounded. There is DO attempt 
b,. me to breaeh our agreement of Ma,. 29th as ,.ou state. In writing ;you 
I was mere1;y endeavoring to clarif,. m,. position 10 far &II the appeal of 
,.our ease was concerned . 
•• From ;your correspondence, I can onl;y conclude that ,"ou are exercis-
ing ;your option to emplo,. other counsel for the appeal, and that the fee 
arrangement iB still in effect. According, I will expect pa,.ment of twent,.-
five per cent of all funds received from Morris Steinbaum. 
"Mr. and Mrs. Leopold Fellner 
9970 West Pico Blvd. 
Loa Angeles, California 
"Dear Mr. and Mrs. Fellner: 
• 'Beapeetlulq, 
PrentiBs Moore" 
"'.Tue 80, 19M 
"B,. ;your action in eeeu.ring &1l order of court Jue 22, 19M, nbeti-
tuting Sidne,. Dorfman as ,"our attorne,. in plaee of m,.eelf in the ease 
of Fellner VI. Bteinbaum, ;you have made it impOBlible for .me to com-
plete the performance of m,. part of an,. agreement that we had 
regarding ,"our representation in that eBee. Your diBeharge of me was 
without cauae and was wrongful I hereb,. elect to treat the contract 
of my employment as ;your attorney in that matter as rescinded and will 
shortly commence an aetion for the determination of the reasonable 
value of my aerviees to date. In thiB action ,"ou will receive credit for the 
$500.00 retainer that ;you gave me at the time the representation first 
arose. 
"I am sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Sidne,. Dorfman for his 
information. 
00: Mr. Sidney Dorfman 
10332 La Grange Avenue 
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From the writings above listed and other evidence the trial 
court found, so far as here material, as follows: plaintiff 
Moore demanded from Fellner $2,000 as additional compensa-
tion for handling the appeal and refused, after demand by 
Fellner, to handle the appeal unless he was paid the $2,000; 
he was discharged by Fellner, and "it is not true that the 
defendants discharged plaintiff without cause or justifica-
tion"; on June 30, 1954, "plaintiff in writing rescinded" his 
contract with defendants; "at the time of his discharge 
plaintiff had substantially performed his part of the agreement 
with defendants, and the services rendered by him were of 
value to the defendants"; the "reasonable value of the profes-
sional services rendered ... by plaintiff ... to the time he was 
discharged is the sum of $13,325.00" of which he had been 
paid on account the sum of $500. As conclusions of law the 
court declared that plaintiff, under the terms of his contract 
with Fellner, was "required to represent" the latter on the 
appeal from the judgment against Steinbaum without further 
charge; that plaintiff's demand for an additional fee was 
wrongful and a breach of his contract; but that plaintiff is 
entitled to recover from Fellner the reasonable value of his 
services, less the $500 paid on account. Judgment was there-
upon entered in plaintiff's favor for $12,825, and these appeals 
by both parties followed. 
As ground for reversal, defendants contend that plaintiff 
was required to represent them on the Steinbaum appeal 
without further compensation, that he wrongfully demanded 
payment of an additional fee of $2,000 and refused to render 
further services on the appeal unless paid that sum, and that 
he thereby breached the employment contract and is therefore 
entitled to no compensation. 
[1] Plaintiff does not dispute that he was obligated to 
handle the appeal if Fellner so requested, and seems not now 
to contend that he was entitled to demand an additional fee 
for so doing. Plaintiff polis, however, urge that he was to 
"do so [only] when theCclient exercised his option and notified 
him," and that the option was never exercised. This conten-
tion, on the record before us, is without substantial merit. 
Previous to his letter of March 2, 1954, to Fellner, plaintiff 
had already, with Fellner's consent, handled all steps proper 
to be performed up to that time relative to the appeal, had 
notified Fellner of the charges for appeal transcripts, and 
had been advised by Fellner that these and additional costs 
would be paid. He had not written the respondent's brief, but 
) 
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.appellant's opening brief had not yet been received. It fur-
ther appears from plaintiff's testimony that he had originally 
drafted the employment contract between the parties but 
that the words "and, at our option, in any of the higher 
courts," as well as the provision that Fellner was not to pay 
as costs the "fees to any other attorneys you [plaintiff] llIay 
employ in these matters," were inserted by Fellner in the 
contract; and, further, that "one of the reasons for ... 
[Fellner's insertions was] to make sure that if the case were 
lost, he would have no obligation of any kind to me or 
anyone employed by me for any services rendered in this 
matter ..• and ... would have the right to . . . have some-
body else prosecute the appeal or take whatever action they 
cared to after the case might be lost in the Superior Court." 
It is thus inferrible that Moore did not understand the option 
provision to apply if, as actually occurred, the case was won 
in the trial court. Moreover, although Fellner testified that 
. following the trial he did not talk to Moore "specifically" 
about "these appeal problems," he did testify to "two or 
three" personal conversations and a "few" telephone con-
versations concerning their progress with Moore's office 
associate, Mr. Lindelof, with whom Moore had previously 
directed that Fellner "always should talk." Moore himself 
testified freely that "whatever was done by my office I take 
the full responsibility for it and it is not that of either Mr. 
Lindelof or anyone else in the office other than my own and 
done under my authority and by my delegation." Thus the 
trial court could infer that Moore was fully aware, prior to 
his letter of March 2, that Fellner expected and intended that 
Moore would handle the appeal, and that no formal notice of 
exercise by Fellner of his option was required. 
[2] Moore, although not contending that he was entitled 
to an additional fee of $2,000, urges that after all he did not 
demand an additional fee for the appeal or make "the fee 
itself a condition precedent to the attorney going ahead with 
the appeal." The language he used in the letter of March 2, 
was: "We should like to have you advise as soon as possible 
as to whether you desire this office to handle the appeal and 
if 80, our fee will be $2,000.00, plus the necessary costs above 
outlined." In his letter of March 10 to Fellner, Moore re-
ferred again to his statement that "should you care to have 
this office represent you in the appeal, . . . our fee would be 
$2,000.00 in addition to any costs on appeal." It is apparent 
that the trial court was warranted in interpreting this lan-
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guage as a demand by Moore for payment of an additional fee 
and a refusal to handle the appeal Jlnless it was paid, and in 
concluding that plaintiff's demand was "wrongful and a 
breach of his contract." It follows that Fellner was not 
bound to make further demands for performance by Moore 
but was justified in accepting his conduct as. a termination of 
"your relationship as our attorney"6 and in employing other 
counsel to handle the appeal. 
However, it does not follow that Moore's right to compen-
sation for services already performed was thereby forfeited. 
[3] Although it has been held that an attorney who wrong-
fully abandons or withdraws from a case which he has con-
tracted to handle, ·or has been discharged for cause by the 
client, . may not recover compensation (see 7 C.J.S. 1031, 
§ 169, subd. a(3), b.; 5 Am.Jur. 363, § 171), this approach 
appears to have grown in part from situations in which the 
contract of employment was considered to be entire and 
indivisible. (See Cahill V. Baird (1902), 7 Cal.Unrep. 61 [70 
P. 1061]; 7 C.J.S. 943, § 110; c/o Oliver v. Campbell (1954), 
43 Cal.2d 298, 304 [3] [273 P.2d 15].) On the other hand 
recovery for services rendered up to the date of a discharge for 
cause has likewise been upheld where the agreed compensa-
tion was payable to the attorney in equal monthly payments; 
i.e., where the services. seemingly were regarded by the court 
as divisible. (See Moser V. Western Harness Racing .Assn. 
(1948),89 Ca1.App.2d 1, 3, 13-14 [200 P.2d 7] ; c/o Salopek v. 
Schoeman·n (1942),20 Ca1.2d 150 [124 P.2d 21], affirming, on 
appeal 0/ assignee 0/ attorney discharged for cause, judgment 
of $300 as reasonable value of his services, claimed by him .to 
be an inadequate award.) 
[4&] In the present case it appears that the parties at 
the time of entering into the employment contract contem-
plated that the attorney's services should be divisible into 
those rendered (1) in the 'superior court, and (2) on any 
appeal from a superior,oourt judgment. The expression" and, 
at our option, in any of the higher courts," was inserted into 
the contract by the client, Fellner, who thus clearly indicated 
that he wished to reserve the right to change counsel on 
appeal. If services are to be divisible for the benefit of the 
client, at his option, then it follows that they may also be 
treated as divisible for the benefit of the attorney, if the 
interests of justice so require. Especially is this true in this 
case where plaintiff had completed ·his services in connection 
with defending Fellner in the Berzon action and had net 
J 
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fGiled 10 perform IJny ,ervicB which 1uul become due for per-
forma.nce up to the time of the disagreement. Fellner did 
not await any actual failure to perform. He had a right to, 
and he did, elect to treat the contract as ended by reason of 
Moore's unjustified demands. Thus, at least in effect, he dis-
charged Moore for cause. No reason whatsoever appears why 
the court cannot fully protect Fellner against any loss on 
account of plaintiff's default in relation to his obligations on 
appeal and at the same time preclude the former's seeming 
unjust enrichment, by awarding reasonable compensation to 
plaintiff for his services in the Berzon action and in the 
Steinbaum action up to the time of breach. Consequently, 
under the above holdings the attorney is entitled to reasonable 
compensation for services already rendered up to the time of 
termination of his attorney-client relationship with Fellner, 
less any expense or other damage to which the client was 
subjected by the default of Moore. 
(5] As declared in 8aJope'k v. 8choemann (1942), auprIJ, 
20 Oa1.2d 150, 153 [1],155 [3], "if an attorney is discharged 
for sufficient cause he is entitled to no more than the reason-
able value 'Of his services rendered prior to his discharge, " has 
"no cause to complain and is fully protected by payment of 
the reasonable value," and may not recover the full contract 
amount (at least if such amount exceeds the reasonable value 
of the services). (8] On the other hand in iL case in which 
the discharge appears to have been without cause, it has 
been held that where the contract amount is less than the 
reasonable value of the services, recovery is nevertheless lim-
ited to the fee fixed by the contract. (See OUtJer v. CIJmpbell 
(1954), aupra., 430al.2d 298, 306 [9].) [4b] In the present 
. case plaintiff BOught and was awarded judgment based on 
reasonable value.- Under the rules above stated his recovery 
must not, of course, exceed the fee fixed by the employment 
contract, less expenses to which the client (defendant) was 
put by the change of counsel. 
Defendants urge, however, that even if plaintiff is entitled 
to judgment, his action was premature because filed before 
final disposition of the Steinbaum case on appeal and recov-
ery by Fellner from Steinbaum. This action was filed De-
cember 1, 1954; the Steinbaum judgment was affirmed on 
appeal on April 25,,1955 (Fell1ler v. 8teinbaum (1955), I1lpra, 
132 Oal.App.2d 509), and hearing by the Supreme Oourt 
ext maT be 1I0ted that plailltilf by his pleac1illga haa BOught reeover;y 
0IIl;y ill fIIOnf_ ",eruit, and haa 1I0t ned for the COIltract fee. 
) 
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was denied on June 23, 1955. It appears that before this 
action went to trial on May 22, 1956, Fellner had collected 
from Steinbaum. ['1] In Jones v. Marlin (1953),41 Ca1.2d 
23, 27 [256 P.2d 905], the rule is stated that "An attorney 
employed under a contingent fee agreement who is wrong-
fully discharged by his client, is generally entitled to the 
same amount of compensation and under tke same contingency 
as if he had completed the services contemplated. [Cita-
tions.]" (Italics added.) [8] If the recovery of an attor-
ney wrongfully discharged under a contingent fee employ-
ment is limited to the same contingency as if he had com-
pleted the services, then one whose discharge has been for 
cause should be similarly limited; i.e., even though the meas-
ure of his recovery is the reasonable value of his services rather 
than (and not in excess of) the full contract amount, he 
should not have judgment until the contingency has 00-
curred-here, recovery by Fellner from Steinbaum. 
[9] However, the unfavored defense that the action was pre-
maturely brought is simply matter of abatement which must 
be pleaded in proper time or it is waived. [10] Further, if 
the defense has ceased to exist at the time defendant seeks 
to raise it, there is no occasion to consider whether it has been 
waiv~d, as it may be disregarded. (Radar v. Rogers (1957), 
49 Cal. 243, 250 [6, 7] [317 P.2d 17].) [11] In the pres-
ent case defendant 1lrst raised the point of premature 1lling 
of the action by an objection to the introduction of evidence 
and by motion for nonsuit when the case was on trial and 
at a time when the basis of the objection had been rendered 
nonexistent by Fellner's actual recovery from Steinbaum. 
Under such circumstances the court was justi1ied in ruling 
against the plea. 
Plaintiff on his part contends (1) that the valuationplaeed 
by the trial court on his services is inadequate and not sup-
ported by the evidence, and (2) that the court erred in 
refusing to consider or place any value upon the services of 
plaintiff's office associate; Lindelof. 
[12] Plaintiff testified that in his opinion the reasonable 
value of services rendered by him and Lindelof to Fellner was 
not less than $40,000. Other attorneys testifying as experts 
gave valuations of $25,000 and of $10,000. Plaintiff further 
testified as to the time he himself had spent on the Fellner 
matters, as well as that Lindelof, who was employed by 
plaintiff, had devoted some 450 hours to assisting him in 
preparation of the cases. Fellner likewise testified that most 
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of his communications and contacts with plaintiff's office were 
made with Lindelof rather than with plaintiff personally, thus 
making it clear that Fellner's employment of plaintiff con-
templated the participation of other attorneys in the services 
rendered by plaintiff, although the cost of their services was 
by the employment contract included in the fee to be paid 
to plaintiff, rather than being charged as additional or sepa-
rately itemized costs to Fellner. It is thus apparent that 
Lindelof's services were included in those provided by Moore 
and should be considered in determining the reasonable value 
of the services rendered by plaintiff to Fellner, and that the 
trial court erred in its express refusal to consider the time 
spent on the Fellner cases by Lindelof. Under such circum-
stances the matter should be remanded for a new determina-
tion in the trial court. (Arenson v. National Auto. &7 Cas. 
[ns. Co. (1957),48 Ca1.2d 528,540 [8] [310 P.2d 961].) 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with the views hereinabove 
expressed, each party to bear his or their own respective costs 
on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and McComb, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. For the reasons stated by Mr. 
Presiding Justice Shinn in the opinion prepared by him for 
the District Court of Appeal in Moore v. Fellner, (Cal.App.) 
318 P .2d 526, I would reverse the judgment with instructions 
to the trial court to vacate the present judgment, make new 
conclusions of law, and enter judgment on the findings and 
conclusions in favor of defendants Fellner. 
Spence, J., concurred. 
The petition of defendants and appellants for a rehearing 
was denied June 17, 1958. Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
